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"Keep on Keeping On"
AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF

BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA

Brian J. Daugherity

The fiftieth anniversary of the Brown v. Board of Education decision
(1954) resulted in an outburst of publications and scholarly activity
related to the history of U.S. school desegregation. Conferences, journals, books, and films examined the many stories behind Brown and
critically examined the decision's legacies and impacts. Much of this
scholarship shed new light on the decision and its results, but an important part of the Brown story remains largely untold-how African
Americans and predominantly black civil rights organizations worked
to implement t~e Supreme Court's decision after 1954. 1
This chapter examines African American efforts to implement the
Brown decision in Virginia. While considering how government officials,
segregationist organizations, and white supporters influenced the implementation process, this study focuses on how the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People and its supporters in Virginia
sought to bring about school desegregation in the state. Blending African
American, southern, legal, and civil rights history, the story sheds new
light on the school desegregation process and the early years of the civil
rights movement in Virginia. 2
The NAACP had a strong record in yirginia long before Brown.
Created in the 1910s, the state's earliest branches were among the first
41

42

Brian J. Daugherity

in the South. The Virginia "State Conference," created in 1935, was the
first in the nation. Its successful implementation of NAACP policies and
rapid growth encouraged the national office of the NAACP to create
State Conferences throughout the nation. 3 In 1947, the Virginia State
Conference was the first in the country to hire a full-time executive secretary, W. Lester Banks, and by the 1950s the State Conference boasted
a membership of twenty-five thousand in more than one hundred
branches around the state, making it the largest in the South. 4
The NAACP's principal opponent in the school integration battle in
Virginia was the state's Dem0cratic political machine, the Byrd Organization. As governor in the 1920s, Harry Flood Byrd Sr. had consolidated
government positions and used patronage to create a political oligarchy
that ruled Virginia for the middle years of the twentieth century. He ran
the organization from Washington, D.C., representing Virginia as a U.s.
senator from ·1933 to 1965. A southern Democrat known for his fiscal
conservatism, Byrd regularly clashed with the national Democratic Party
on spending issues and the party's growing support of civil rights.
Though not virulently racist, the Byrd Organization's leadership strongly
supported states' rights and opposed efforts to limit its authority over
the commonwealth, including the right to maintain segregated schools. 5
Virginia's schools had been racially segregated since their founding
just after the Civil War. In 1902, a new, post-Reconstruction state constitution required segregated education as well. During the debate over
~ts adoption, Paul Barringer, chairman of the faculty at the University of
Virginia, argued that educational opportunities for African Americans
be limited to "'a Sunday-school training,'" because the principal function of black Virginians was as a '''source of cheap labor for a warm climate."'6 By the 1920s, state legislation had expanded segregation to
include virtually every aspect of life, and clarified how segregation
would affect Virginia's public schools.
The results were devastating for black education. In 1925, Virginia
spent an average of $40.27 per year on each white public school student,
but only $10.47 on each black.? Facilities for blacks, teacher salaries,
course offerings, and educational resources suffered as a result. In 1940,
L. P. Whitten of Abingdon pleaded with national NAACP director of
branches William Pickens: "If you will see that it is carried in the
Pittsburgh Courier, I can secure pictures of all schools here so that the
public may know of the deplorable conditions."8
In the 1930s, the Virginia NAACP brought legal attacks against these
inequities. Staff attorneys, including Oliver White Hill and Spottswood
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Robinson III, played leading roles in the national NAACP's equalization
campaign of the 1930s and 1940s. The national NAACP focused its
equalization efforts on Virginia, and by the late 1940s equalization lawsuits had been filed against over a hundred districts throughout the
state. 9 Working closely with Special Counsel Thurgood Marshall, the
association's head attorney, Hill and Robinson helped develop legal techniques that led to the improvement of black educational opportunities
throughout the South. IO Oliver Hill's personal relationship with Thurgood
Marshall, begun as classmates at Howard Law School, developed into a
professional partnership.ll
World War II broke out in the midst of the equalization campaign.
Oliver Hill, W. Lester Banks, S. W. Tucker, and a number of other civil
rights leaders from Virginia entered the military, slowing down the push
for educational equality. At the same time, World War II increased African American aspirations for equal treatment. In Virginia and elsewhere,
postwar activism revitalized the equalization campaign and set the stage
for an even greater legal assault-on segregation itself. 12
It was yet another World War II veteran, L. Francis Griffin, who
connected the NAACP to one of its most important anti-segregation
cases in Virginia, Davis v. Prince Edward County. Griffin, from Farmville,
served in the army for four years during World War II, and then returned
to Prince Edward County and took over as minister of his father's
Baptist church. Recognizing the injustices of the county's educational
system, Griffin and other black leaders pushed county officials to equalize the schools until the spring of 1951, when students at the all-black
Moton High School walked out of school in protest.
Initially the students sought only a new black high school. State
NAACP leaders, however, explained that the association no longer filed
equalization lawsuits and would only file a lawsuit challenging segregation in the county's public schools. With some reservations, the black
community agreed, and Davis v. Prince Edward County was filed in federal district court in May 1951. Later, the case became one of the five
cases bundled together by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of
Education. 13
As might be expected, Virginia's political leaders reacted negatively
to the Brown decision. Over the previous three years, the state's legal
team had presented an extremely vigorous defense of segregation before
the courts involved in Brown. Following the decision, Senator Byrd
called the ruling "the most serious blow that has been struck against the
rights of the states."14 When some state officials offered less provocative
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responses, Byrd reacted angrily, and officials around the state noticed.
By midsummer, Governor Thomas B. Stanley-who had initially spoken
of compliance-declared, "I shall use every legal means at my command
to continue segregated schools in Virginia. "15
Virginia's outcry clearly demonstrated that few of the state's public
officials had previously entertained the idea of abandoning segregation
in the public schools. Though federal courts had ordered the commonwealth to begin desegregating its institutions of higher learning, and also
interstate transportation, those changes were resisted by most white
Virginians. The state's clear and extensive defense of segregation in the
litigation leading to Brown, and state officials' negative reactions to
Brown, suggest that segregation was still a remarkably solid, and enthusiastically embraced, institution within the commonwealth. The historian Robbins Gates-discussing the period before Brown-noted,
"There is no reason to assume that any responsible, white, public official in Virginia envisioned that state's governmental policy as moving
'gradually' toward a time when white and Negro children would attend
integrated public schools. "16
Following the decision, state officials rapidly developed the means
to preserve segregated education. In August 1954, Governor Stanley
appointed a thirty-two-man board, known as the Gray Commission, to
study the Brown decision and recommend a course of actionY Its
leader, Garland Gray, was a state senator from Southside, Virginia, and
a Byrd Organization stalwart. In October, Gray proclaimed, "'I have
nothing against the Negro race as such, and I have lived with them all
my life, but I don't intend to have my grandchildren go to school with
them.">18
Governor Stanley also organized a meeting of southern governors in
Richmond to rally resistance to Brown. Nine attended the June 1954
gathering, with three others sending representatives. After a daylong
closed-door session, nine of the states resolved "not to comply voluntarily with the Supreme Court's decision against racial segregation in the
public schools."19 The remaining states-Kentucky, Maryland, and West
Virginia-decided their problems of adjustment were surmountable.
That these three states bordered Virginia seemed of little concernVirginia aligned itself with states further south.
In fact, the meeting of southern governors suggested that Virginia
was prepared to help lead the South in opposition to the Supreme
Court's ruling. As former state legislator Benjamin Muse put it in the
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Washington Post, "Virginia, with its glorious role in the early history of
the republic and again in the struggle for the great Lost Cause-also
with its genteel and honored political leadership of the day-was surely
indicated to carry the banner of the South in this latest conflict. "20
At the same time, the NAACP geared up to force implementation of
the historic decision. Its national office, located in New York City, traditionally made the major policy decisions for the association, and the
implementation of Brown would be no exception. 21 The national office
included the NAACP's board of directors, executive secretary and staff,
and the association's many departments. 22 It also worked closely with
the NAACP's Legal Defense and Educational Fund, a separate but
related organization that handled much of the litigation involved in the
implementation of Brown. 23 Clearly, the association's school desegregation efforts would be directed from New York City.
In the association hierarchy, State Conferences made up the level
below the national office. By 1954 a State Conference existed in every
southern state. Their responsibilities included the implementation of
national office policies and the establishment and oversight of local
branches. Branches, sometimes referred to as "chapters," were the lowest level of the NAACP hierarchy. Their objectives and policies were
strongly influenced by the national office, which also assigned annual
branch membership and fundraising goals. 24
The weekend following the Brown decision, the national NAACP
held a conference on school desegregation in Atlanta, Georgia. At the
gathering, staff from the national office outlined a previously developed
program for implementing Brown to the association's southern State
Conference presidents. 2s The southern leaders adopted resolutionsproposed by the national office-emphasizing the importance of national
and state oversight of the implementation process. 26 In a form letter sent
to southern branches shortly after the meeting, the national office emphasized, "It is imperative that all of our units act in concert as directed to
effectively implement this historic decision. "27
The conference delegates also adopted the Atlanta Declaration,
which set forth the NAACP's implementation program for the immediate future. The declaration asked NAACP branches to collect signatures
from black parents who favored immediate desegregation in order to
press school boards in local communities for compliance. Rather than
initiate widespread litigation to force desegregation, however, the
national office instructed its branches to negotiate and cooperate with
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their local school boards. 28 Branch leaders were encouraged to gather
the support of various black and white community organizations to
effectuate this process. As the Atlanta Declaration explained, "We are
instructing all of our branches in every affected area to petition their
local school boards to abolish segregation without delay and to assist
these agencies in working out ways and means of implementing the
Court's ruling. "29
A month after the Atlanta Conference, the NAACP's annual convention in Dallas, Texas, solidified the implementation program and tried
to spur its branches into action. Focusing on the process whereby Brown
would be implemented, the convention provided guid~nce to branches
during the interim between Brown and the Supreme Court's ruling on
the implementation of Brown. 3o Daylong workshops explained the
national office program and the prospective role of the branches. A key
goal was building community support among whites as well as blacks to
bring about desegregation. Local branches were again encouraged to
seek support from ministers, labor unions, educational organizations,
and social and civic groups for desegregation. 31 Litigation, effective but
abrasive, was to be avoided. Conference delegates resolved that "the
enjoyment of many rights and opportunities of first class citizenship is
not dependent on legal action but rather on the molding of public sentiment and the exertion of public pressure to make democracy work."32
Looking back, it is clear that NAACP leaders initially were overoptimistic about the implementation of Brown. A number, including
Thurgood Marshall, expected the decision to bring about rapid and profound change. 33 The historian Alfred Kelly, who worked closely with
Marshall and other NAACP attorneys, later noted, "'In a sense, these
men were profoundly naive. They really felt that once the legal barriers
fell, the whole black-white situation would change."'34 Oliver Hill, head
of the Virginia State Conference legal staff, explained that his optimism
was based on the belief that southern whites respected the law. When
Brown declared segregation unconstitutional, however, Hill noted that
"many Negroes experienced a rude awakening as white folks' reputed
great respect for the law disappeared."35
While its legal staff worked with national office lawyers on arguments for the Supreme Court's implementation decision, the Virginia
State Conference directed its branches to begin working toward school
desegregation. On May 26, 1954, executive secretary Lester Banks sent
a letter to the officers of the conference's eighty-eight branches announc-
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ing a "State-wide Emergency Meeting" to discuss carrying out the
national office's implementation program in Virginia. 36 The meeting
took place in Richmond on June 6, 1954, and more than three hundred
NAACP representatives from around the state attended. The delegates
unanimously endorsed the recommendations of the Atlanta Conference,
but noted that additional planning would be needed to implement the
national office's program in Virginia. They decided that the State
Conference, with branch input, should develop a statewide program that
would allow the Virginia NAACP to operate with both "uniformity and
efficiency." In the meantime, the delegates agreed to refrain from desegregation activitiesY
State Conference leaders also called upon the Virginia government to
comply with Brown. In June, Oliver Hill and a small delegation of other
African American leaders met with Governor Thomas B. Stanley. During
the closed-door session, the black leaders suggested that Stanley position
Virginia to lead the South in compliance with the ruling. 38 Several months
later, Hill and fellow NAACP attorney W. Hale Thompson, along with
several white liberals and other African Americans, attended a public
hearing on the Brown decision sponsored by the Gray Commission. Hill
implored the commission, "Gentlemen, face the dawn and not the setting
sun. A new day is being born."39
The public hearing, however, symbolized the challenges facing the
supporters of integration. Most of those who addressed the comJ;llission,
including a number of public officials, called for the continuation of segregation. After Sarah Patton Boyle, a native white Virginian, spoke in
favor of integration, an audience member accused her of supporting
the mongrelization of the white race. 40 One leading white newspaper,
the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, called the event a "'field day for [white]
extremists.' "41
By then, segregationists had organized and developed plans for the
post-Brown era. The state's leading segregationist organization, the
Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties, was established
in October 1954 and grew rapidly. In the tradition of Virginia paternalism, the group denounced violence and outright intimidation, focusing
instead on political persuasion and social and economic pressure to
bring about its goals. Based in Southside, the group rallied Virginians to
oppose Brown on the basis of both white supremacy and states' rights. 42
Though only a small percentage of white Virginians joined the
Defenders or other segregationist organizations, the vast majority did
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support the preservation of segregation. 43 Only white liberals, who
made up a small percentage of the population, openly supported racial
equality, and as they came under attack from segregationists, fewer liberals publicly expressed support for integration over time. 44 Another segment of Virginia's population-white moderates-strongly favored
segregation, but encouraged compliance with Brown rather than openly
defying the Supreme Court or abandoning the state's public schools. 45
Unfortunately for the NAACP, Virginia's segregationists initially dominated the debate over school desegregation in Virginia, and they
opposed integration, the NAACP, and the Supreme Court. 46
The high court announced its ruling on the implementation of Brown,
commonly referred to as Brown II, on May 31, 1955. The decision,
because it failed to establish a time frame for school desegregation and
allowed federal courts to accept delays in desegregation, was widely
viewed as a setback for the NAACPY The following month, the national
office sponsored an "Emergency" Southwide Conference on Desegregation in Atlanta. At the conference, and again at the NAACP's annual
convention in June, the association reiterated its commitment to the
national office's original implementation program established in the
spring of 1954. Perhaps underestimating the additional hurdles posed
by Brown II, the national office maintained that, "In the overwhelming
majority of instances it can be expected that complia~ce without legal
action will be the rule, perhaps grudgingly and reluctantly in some areas,
but compliance, nevertheless. "48 Southern branches were requested to
engage local school boards and community organizations to press for
desegregation that fall. 49
The Virginia State Conference dramatically increased its desegregation efforts following the implementation ruling. On June 12, 1955, the
State Conference sponsored another statewide meeting to explain how
to carry out the NAACP program in Virginia. NAACP officials told
branches in communities that were acting in "good faith"-where
school boards were making a "prompt and reasonable" sta,rt toward
desegregation-to work with school officials and community organizations to bring about desegregation at the earliest practicable date.
Branches in communities with recalcitrant school boards, however, were
ordered to formally petition their school boards for the admittance of
black students into the white schools. 50
Virginia's branches undertook the petitioning process with vigor.
Association members convinced black parents in many communities to

On"

49

support their desegregation efforts, despite growing white opposition.
By the end of the summer, NAACP branches had submitted petitions to
school boards in Alexandria, Arlington, Charlottesville, Isle of Wight
County, Newport News, and Norfolk. Others were in preparation. The
first real steps toward bringing about desegregation in Virginia had been
taken, laying the groundwork for possible litigation. Still, each school
board flatly refused to desegregate its schools that falLS1
At the same time, examples of growing defiance in Virginia troubled
the State Conference. In June, the state board of education ordered the
continuation of segregation for the 1955-56 school year. In November,
the Gray Commission suggested ways the state could negate or minimize
the impact of Brown. The Defenders of State Sovereignty spoke of abandoning the state's public schools completely, and a growing number of
political leaders supported the indefinite maintenance of school segregation statewide.
Virginia's segregationists were fortified by the lack of support for
integration shown by President Eisenhower and a strong axis of opposition in the United States Congress. The president supported gradual
change and compliance with the law but declined to playa leading role
in the school desegregation process. 52 Roy Wilkins later commented:
"President Eisenhower was a fine general and a good, decent man, but
if he had fought World War II the way he fought for civil rights, we
would all be speaking German today."53 In Congress in March 1956,
101 representatives and senators adopted the Southern Manifesto, pledging to use all legal means to prevent the integration of schools in the
South. Virginia's Harry Byrd helped draw up the measure. 54
In the midst of this rising opposition, the national office of the
NAACP became increasingly skeptical about the prospects for voluntary
compliance with Brown. Federal district court rulings in the summer of
1955-involving two of the cases that were part of the original Brown
decision-failed to bring about school desegregation that fall, as the
NAACP had requested. 55 Growing racial violence in the South, including the harassment of NAACP members and the murder of Emmett Till,
also influenced NAACP leaders.56 A growing number in the national
office believed that widespread litigation might be the only method to
force the South to comply with Brown. 57
In January 1956, abandoning its initial implementation plan, the
NAACP announced a massive increase in southern school desegregation
lawsuits. 58 The national office set up a timetable for filing the suits at a
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southwide conference in Atlanta in February. It chose to proceed stateby-state, filing litigation based on local circumstances (the level of commitment within the black community and the likelihood of community
resistance), available legal aid, and the case histories of federal judges,
some of whom were more liberal than the general white southern public. 59 Legal action begalJ that spring in eight southern states, including
Virginia, which had completely resisted desegregation thus far. 60
The Virginia NAACP filed lawsuits in four communities in April
and May 1956. The chosen locations were Newport News, Norfolk,
Charlottesville, and Arlington-all moderate urban areas. In addition,
litigation against Prince Edward County was renewed. Without exception, the class-action lawsuits sought to bring about school desegregation by September 1956. 61 As Oliver Hill explained, "The reasonable
time has passed."62
As might be expected, the new NAACP litigation brought tensions
in Virginia to the exploding point. Animosity toward the association,
already obvious, skyrocketed. Harassment of association members and
supporters increased, and even white liberals urged the state NAACP to
reconsider its approach.63 Looking back in 1961, Benjamin Muse wrote,
"It is difficult to describe the intensity with which the NAACP was hated
by white Virginians. "64
The NAACP litigation also prompted the state of Virginia to react.
Historians of the civil rights era often portray the rise of state-sanctioned
massive resistance as a reaction to the growth of federal power represented by the Brown decision. In this interpretation, massive resistance
represents a manifestation of states' rights, and most southern resistance
is aimed at the federal government and the federal court system. This
portrayal, however, minimizes the influence of African American agency
in the post-Brown milieu. Clearly the NAACP's shift toward widespread
litigation, and the filing of lawsuits in early 1956, fueled the rise of massive resistance. The state of Virginia-and the South as a whole-was
responding to its greatest threat. 65
In February 1956, following a series of inflammatory editorials in a
leading Virginia newspaper, the Virginia state legislature adopted a
Resolution of Interposition, pledging to oppose the implementation of
Brown. 66 The resolution resembled statements adopted by other southern legislatures that spring, as well as the Southern Manifesto adopted
by the U.S. Congress in March. 67 The Virginia resolution's leading supporter, Richmond News Leader editor James Jackson Kilpatrick, had
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previously written to Senator Byrd, "I would toss an old battle-cry back
at the NAACP: Hell, we have only begun to fight."68
In the summer of 1956 Governor Stanley called a special session of
the state legislature to deal with the unfolding situation. During a
month-long session starting in late August, the General Assembly
adopted twenty-three laws dealing with school segregation. Together the
measures defended school segregation statewide and provided new powers to the governor to deal with unfavorable court decisions. 69 Seven of
the bills were developed to impede the work of organizations promoting school desegregation in the state. Referring to the NAACP, delegate
James Thomson of Alexandria declared, "With this set of bills ... we
can bust that organization ... wide open. "?O The state of Virginia had ·
declared war on the NAACP.
As its school desegregation lawsuits wound their way through the
court system, the State Conference worked to minimize the effects of the
state's new "massive resistance" laws. For several years it sparred with
legislative committees set up to investigate the supporters of school integration in Virginia.?1 The State Conference also initiated litigation against
the Virginia attorney general with the goal of overturning the General
Assembly's new legislation. These legal efforts quickly bogged down in
the courts and the legislation reduced the effectiveness of the Virginia
NAACP's school desegregation campaign. Publicly, the association argued
that the anti-NAACP legislation united the black community behind the
NAACP, but, when pressed, NAACP officials conceded that the attack
had cost the association members, money, and valuable resources.72
Massive resistance, however, did not shut down the NAACP in
Virginia or force the abandonment of its desegregation campaign. To
counteract the loss of members and funding, the State Conference asked
its branches to increase membership drives and fundraising. One letter
in early 1957 entreated, "Never before has our NAACP needed the support of every Negro citizen as it has today." ?3 To protect its finances, the
State Conference transferred its "principal monies" to New York.?4 And
perhaps most important, the association tried to maintain morale with
a stream of pronouncements and memorandums. One, written by executive secretary Lester Banks in early 1957, urged members to "keep on
keeping on" until the NAACP's objectives had been achieved.?5 Under
the circumstances, it is doubtful Banks could have asked for more.
In the meantime events unfolded in Virginia's courtrooms. In the
summer of 1956, federal courts ordered desegregation in Charlottesville
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and Arlington to begin during the coming school year. With help from
the state, both localities appealed, temporarily suspending the court
orders, but the victories by the NAACP helped fuel state legislators'
anger that summer. Several of the state's new massive resistance laws,
including a pupil placement provision, established additional school
desegregation roadblocks, forcing NAACP attorneys to spend much of
1956 and 1957 in court,76 By early 1958 the state's pupil placement law
had been ruled unconstitutional, and federal judges in Virginia renewed
orders calling for school desegregation the following September. 77
In September 1958, rather than allow federal courts to force
Virginia to integrate, Governor J. Lindsay Almond Jr. closed nine public schools in Charlottesville, Norfolk, and Warren County.78 Many of
the affected white students enrolled in private schools funded by state
taxpayer money and created with help from segregationist organizations. Moderate whites, on the other hand, spoke openly against the
school closings and worked to protect public education in the commonwealth. The NAACP filed suit immediately. Earlier that spring, Oliver
Hill noted that if school closures were needed to "bring Virginia to its
senses, then the sooner we reach that crisis the better. "79
In January 1959, federal and state courts declared the cornerstone
of massive resistance-Virginia's school-closing law-unconstitutional.
Though extreme segregationists encouraged the state to adopt new legislation to continue massive resistance, Governor Almond gave in.
During a special session of the state legislature, Almond prevented the
passage of additional massive resistance legislation and secured the
repeal of the school-closing law. 80 Shortly thereafter, authorities
reopened the closed schools in the affected localities, and on February
2, 1959, twenty-one black students entered formerly all-white public
schools in Virginia. Nearly five years after Brown, the Virginia NAACP
had achieved one of its most cherished goals. 81
Following this historic event, Virginia's public officials worked to
minimize the amount of school desegregation that would take place in
the coming years. Shifting from absolute defiance to token compliance,
the General Assembly adopted new legislation in the spring of 1959. A
new pupil placement law centralized the assignment process under the
authority of the state Pupil Placement Board (PPB) and modified the
process. The state also allowed school districts to adopt Virginia's first
freedom-of-choice plans, which allowed parents to choose which schools
their children would attend. A new tuition grant law supported white
o
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students who chose to attend segregated schools. 82 Explaining the result
of this new legislation, historians Andrew Lewis and Matthew Lassiter
write, "the policies which supplanted massive resistance-private school
tuition grants, discriminatory pupil placement laws, freedom-of-choice
plans, and incessant legal delays-thwarted substantial progress toward
meaningful school integration throughout the 1960s.,,83
Substantial progress would have taken even longer without the
efforts of the State Conference. Its attorneys continued to press for
desegregation in the federal courts, handling dozens of cases from many
parts of Virginia in subsequent years. Its efforts forced additional localities to admit African American students into their formerly all-white
schools, and pressured districts which had already begun desegregation
to admit greater numbers of black students.
Over time, the pace of school desegregation increased. Under judicial pressure, the state's Pupil Placement Board-which continued to
reject most black applications for transfer-slowly increased the number of blacks admitted, and even forced some districts to begin desegregation. 84 Other localities chose to assign pupils on their own and
voluntarily increased the number of black students in formerly white
schools. 85 At the same time, Virginia's federal courts ordered token desegregation throughout the state. Still the U.S. Supreme Court, which
accepted token desegregation, expressed disappointment with the pace of
southern school desegregation in 1963-a sign of what was to come. 86
Other branches of the federal government also placed increasing
pressure on the white South. In 1964 Congress passed the Civil Rights
Act, which threatened to cut federal funding to localities that refused to
integrate their schools. An increase in federal public school funding the
following year, coupled with compliance guidelines from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), offered additional
incentives for southern districts to desegregate. 87
Fearful of losing federal funding, districts throughout Virginia notified HEW of their plans to comply in 1965. The most popular route
involved adopting freedom-of-choice plans, which allowed students to
choose which schools they would attend. Although these plans placed
the burden of desegregation on African Americans, and minimized
desegregation in other ways, they were initially accepted by the federal
government. 88 By the summer of 1965, approximately 90 of the state's
130 public school divisions had experienced some desegregation, and
the process was scheduled to begin in most others that fall. 89
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Still, the NAACP's efforts had failed to bring about widespread
school integration in the state. HEW's desegregation guidelines promised to increase the pace of integration, but the department's acceptance
of freedom-of-choice plans continued to place the burden of desegregation on African Americans, who-because of intimidation, community
ties, and other factors,-often favored the status quo. 90 At the same
time, federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, refused to
require school boards to undertake more active, and effective, integration efforts. 91 In 1965, fewer than 12,000 of the approximately 235,000
black students in Virginia went to desegregated schools.92
In response to the slow pace of change, the NAACP launched a new
wave of school desegregation litigation in the mid-1960s. Multiple lawsuits in Virginia attacked freedom-of-choice plans, which Lester Banks
called "a continuation of Virginia's ll-year effort to stave off school
integration."93 The NAACP also sought the nondiscriminatory assignment of personnel and the abandonment of potentially discriminatory
construction plans. 94 Arguing that the burden of school desegregation
belonged to local school boards, as opposed to African Americans, the
NAACP asked federal courts to force local boards to take the initiative
in integrating the public schools. 95
The most important new lawsuit in Virginia was based in New Kent
County, just east of Richmond. 96 Rural and conservative, the county had
seen little racial change in the years since Brown v. Board of Education.
The president of the local NAACP, Calvin Coolidge Green, had pressed
the county to begin desegregation in the early 1960s to no avail. In
response to the board's refusal, Green met with attorneys from the state
NAACP and in early 1965 helped develop a lawsuit to force the school
board to integrate the county's schools. Charles C. Green v. County
School Board of New Kent County, Virginia, filed in Green's youngest
son's name, was filed in March 1965. In the suit, NAACP attorneys
pointed out that the county's schools remained 100 percent segregated
eleven years after Brown. Faced with the NAACP lawsuit and pressure
from HEW, the county adopted a freedom-of-choice plan in the summer
of 1965, but the number of student transfers remained small.
The lawsuit fared poorly in the lower federal courts. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ruled against the NAACP
in 1966, as did the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Both ruled that the
county's hastily developed freedom-of-choice plan fulfilled its requirement to integrate the county's schools. These decisions were disappoint-
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ing but not surprising, as other NAACP suits at this time suffered the
same fate. 97
After the ruling by the Fourth Circuit Court, NAACP attorneys
debated their course of action, eventually choosing to take the Green
case to the U.S. Supreme Court. As a test case to show that current
desegregation programs-including freedom of choice-were not working, Green had a lot to offer. County demographics showed that school
segregation prior to 1965 had been a deliberate policy, and the county's
freedom-of-choice plan hadn't substantially altered the racial makeup of
the schools. "We had all these school cases, and we wanted to get a case
to be the pilot case so the Supreme Court could really break the logjam," former State Conference attorney Henry L. Marsh III explained.
"New Kent was the logical choice. "98 The NAACP petitioned for, and
was granted, certiorari by the Supreme Court.
At the same time, the federal court system exhibited signs of a new
attitude on the issue of school integration. In 1965 Judge J. Skelly
Wright of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia predicted
that the Supreme Court would eventually rule de facto school segregation unconstitutiona1. 99 In 1967, Judge John Minor Wisdom of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals wrote that "boards and officials administering
public schools have the affirmative duty under the Fourteenth Amendment to bring about an integrated, unitary school system in which there
are no Negro schools and no white schools-just schools."lo0 The
Supreme Court itself was also increasingly forceful in its denunciations
of non-compliance. In Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward
County (1964) the Court declared, "There has been entirely too much
deliberation and not enough speed in enforcing the constitutional rights
which we held in Brown v. Board of Education. "101
On May 27, 1968, the Supreme Court issued its fuling in Charles C.
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County. The Court found
that the county was operating a dual system of schools, down to "every
facet of school operations-faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities." 102 This finding undermined the Court's
1954-55 desegregation decisions, which put an affirmative duty on
school boards to establish a "unitary, non-racial system of public education." With regard to the county's freedom-of-choice plan, the Court
noted, "it is relevant that this first step did not come until some 11 years
after Brown I was decided and 1 0 years after Brown II directed the
making of a 'prompt and reasonable start.'" Furthermore, "rather than
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further the dismantling of the dual system, the [freedom-of-choice] plan
has operated simply to burden children and their parents with a responsibility which Brown II placed squarely on the School Board."103
Echoing Judge Wisdom's ruling, the Court ordered the county
school board to develop a plan to "convert promptly to a system without a 'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools." Though it
did not rule that freedom-of-choice plans were necessarily unconstitutional, the Court found that, where other plans could be more effective,
they were preferable. Justice William J. Brennan, writing for the unanimous Court, wrote: "The burden on a school board today is to come
forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises
realistically to work now." 104
The impact of the Green decision spread far beyond the borders of
New Kent County. It was Green that announced the duty of school
boards to affirmatively eliminate all vestiges of state-imposed segregation, transforming Brown's prohibition of segregation into a requirement of integration and prompting Supreme Court Justice William H.
Rehnquist to refer to Green later as a "drastic extension of Brown. "105
Federal courts, recognizing that northern school segregation was related
to discriminatory policies, also increasingly required northern school
boards to re-fashion their desegregation plans to eliminate dual school
systems as wel1. 106
Across Virginia, school boards adjusted their policies to achieve the
new mandate. In most cases, this meant abandoning freedom-of-choice
plans in favor of more substantive measures. 107 The NAACP pushed
those who hesitated, filing and renewing litigation in federal courts
around the state. By the early 1970s, most districts had integrated their
black and white student populations. In urban areas, this oftentimes
meant busing students, which was angrily contested by whites. In rural
areas around the state, geographically based attendance zones usually
eliminated racially identifiable schools. lOS
Within only a few years, aided by follow-up Supreme Court decisions in 1969 and 1971, the nation witnessed the culmination of a key
goal of the civil rights movement-the integration of southern public
schools. l09 A National Park Service study of school desegregation in the
United States explains: "The results were startling. In 1968-69, 32 per
cent of black students in the South attended integrated schools; in
1970-71, the number was 79 per cent."110 Acknowledging the decision's impact, the historian and legal scholar Davison Douglas calls
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Green "the Court's most important school desegregation opinion since
Brown."111
Integration, unfortunately, did not come without a cost to African
American communities, in Virginia or around the nation. In the South,
integration was generally carried out under the control of white public
officials, and decision making was not always even-handed. Many black
schools in Virginia were closed or converted to lower-level schools during the process, and African American educators and administrators
were demoted and sometimes fired.1 12
The battle over school desegregation in Virginia represents a key
aspect of the struggle for black equality. The long-lasting campaign
started in the 1800s, when Jim Crow schools were established in the
state. In the twentieth century the NAACP initially fought to improve
black educational opportunities in the commonwealth, before filing litigation designed to overturn segregation in the early 1950s. Between
1954 and 1959, as African Americans in the state fought to overcome
massive resistance and bring about initial school desegregation, they also
laid the groundwork for broader civil rights activism in the 1960s. While
the NAACP continued to focus on educational opportunities, the larger
black community worked to eliminate Jim Crow in other aspects of life.
Federal government aid in the 1960s, along with growing support
within the judiciary, aided the campaign for school desegregation, culminating in the late 1960s with the desegregation of public education in
Virginia. As the twenty-first century opens, attention remains focused on
how to ensure equal educational opportunities for minority students
throughout the state.

262

Notes to

39-41

"Perpetuation Theory and the Long-Term Effects of School Desegregation,"
Review of Educational Research ~4 (Winter 1994): 531-55.
56. Tim Simmons, "Taking Different Roads," Raleigh News and Observer,
February 20,2001, AI; Rebecca E. Eden, "Dropping Diversity in Schools,"
Durham Herald-Sun, August 22, 2001, AI.
57. Elizabeth Wade Hall, "Durham Students Express Strong Feelings on
Redistricting," and "9 of 10 in N.C. Back Integration," Durham Herald-Sun,
February 25 and May 5, 1994, A2, C1.
58. Simmons, "Taking Different Roads."

"Keep on Keeping On": African Americans and the Implementation of
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The historian Adam Fairclough agrees: "The NAACP is, paradoxically, the
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Louisiana, 19t:5-1972 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1995), xiv. See
also Matthew Lassiter and Andrew Lewis, editors, The Moderates' Dilemma:
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21. "Centrality," or hierarchical control, was a key concept for the
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24. Morris (in The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement 33) notes,
"Decision-making within the NAACP was highly centralized. Most plans of
action had to be cleared through the hierarchy in New York." For more on
the hierarchical nature of the NAACP, see note 21 above. The NAACP hierarchy also included a Regional Office system that was developed in the late
1940s to provide additional support for branches, but the regional offices
were understaffed and struggling in the mid-1950s; see Finch, The NAACp,
122; Warren St. James, A Case Study, 98; Memorandum from Mr. Current to
Mr. Wilkins, October 8, 1946, Part 17, reel 14, NAACP Papers microfilm;
Western Union telegram from Roy Wilkins to Franklin Williams, December
19, 1957, and an identical telegram the same day from Wilkins to Ruby
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Education [1954 Annual Convention]," Supplement to Part 1 (1951-55), reel
10, NAACP Papers microfilm.
32. "Resolutions Adopted, Education," Supplement to Part 1 (1951-55),
reel 10, NAACP Papers microfilm; Davison Douglas, Reading, Writing, and
Race, 62. Roy Wilkins later explained: "popular opinion to the contrary, the
NAACP would prefer using legal action as a last resort in the many situations
which will arise in hundreds of communities"; Roy Wilkins, "The Role of the
NAACP in the Desegregation Process," Social Problems (Official Journal of
the Society for the Study of Social Problems), April 1955, Volume 2, No.4
(New York: Johnson Reprint Corp'.), 201. It is interesting to note that the
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NAACP initially accepted what would later be called token desegregation,
meaning the integration of small numbers of black students into white
schools, as opposed to full-scale integration. See Letter from Roy Wilkins to
Dr. E. B. Henderson, October 25, 1955, Part II, box A228, NAACP Papers.
The national office also spent a good deal of time at the annual convention
working with the southern State Conference leaders. Meetings and workshops
made sure the state units of the NAACP understood and followed the national
implementation program. NAACP special counsel Thurgood Marshall noted
the importance of this after the convention, "the state level is the implementation level of national policy"'; "Remarks of Thurgood Marshall at Press
Conference, June 30, 1954," Supplement to Part 1 (1951-55), red 10,
NAACP Papers microfilm; see also "Developing Community Action Program
to Speed Up Integration," Part 3, series C, reel 5, NAACP Papers microfilm. It
is worth highlighting that different circumstances in each state affected the
NAACP's implementation efforts. Keeping in close contact with its State
Conferences, the NAACP ,discerned where to direct more, or less, attentionallowing it to respond to state legislatures and other events more effectively.
This emphasis on the state level as the level of implementation continued
throughout the desegregation process, and is one reason for the state level format for 'this book. See Kluger, Simple Justice, 746.
33. Joseph Thorndike, "The Sometimes Sordid Level of Race and
Segregation," in Moderates Dilemma, 62, quotes Thurgood Marshall: '''I'm
afraid we assumed that after a short period of time of one to five years the
states would give in.'" See also Kluger, Simple Justice, 714; Fairclough, Race
and Democracy, 167; Janken, White, 366. See also Christina Greene, "The
New Negro Ain't Scared No More!" in Lau, Grassroots, 255. Patterson
(Brown v. Board of Education, xxix) quotes Dr. Ken Clark, one of the
NAACP's expert witnesses in the Brown litigation, in 1993: "'I look back and
shudder at how naive we all were in our belief in the steady progress racial
minorities would make through:programs of litigation and education.'"
34. Quote is from Kluger, Simple Justice, 639.
35. Quote is from Hill, The Big Bang, 73. See also page 147, in which Hill
notes, "Looking back, I guess that I should have known better and not been
surprised. "
36. "Report of the Committee on Offenses against the Administration of
Justice," Appendix 10, Part 20, reel 12, NAACP Papers microfilm. It is worth
noting that the Virginia State Conference carefully followed the directives of
the national office when working to implement Brown. In between the Atlanta
Conference and the annual convention, the State Conferences were asked to
call together their branches and "instruct them on procedure to implement the
[Atlanta] Declaration"; Address by Thurgood Marshall to 1954 Convention,
Supplement to Part One (1951-55), reel 10, NAACP Papers microfilm. See
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also "Follow-Up RE Atlanta Conference," undated (Mayor June 1954), Part
V, box V2595, NAACP Papers, which lays out a course of action for southern
State Conferences to follow, allowing one to see similarities between national
policy and State Conference actions in 1954. See also Hershman, "A
Rumbling in the Museum," 41.
37. "Report of the Committee on Offenses against the Administration of
Justice," Appendix 11, Part 20, reel 12, frame 1018, NAACP Papers microfilm. For more on the meeting, see "Press Releases, Virginia State Conference,
June 7, 1954," Part II, box A228, NAACP Papers.
38. Hershman, "A Rumbling in the Museum," 42; Gates, The Making of
Massive Resistance, 29-30; Hill, The Big Bang, 170.
39. Quote is from "Statement on Behalf of the Virginia State Conference,
NAACP Branches at Public Hearing before the Commission to Study Public
Education At the Mosque on November 15, 1954," by Oliver W. Hill, Part II,
box A228, NAACP Papers. See also Richmond Times-Dispatch, November
17, 1954; Hershman, "A Rumbling in the Museum," 53-54, 106; Gates, The
Making of Massive Resistance, 40. Hill and Thompson's remarks echoed
national NAACP requests urging Virginia to prepare for school desegregation
by September 1955. At its 1954 annual convention, the national office had
decided that September 1955 was to be the target date for desegregation in the
South; see "Association Press Release, July 4, 1954," Supplement to Part 1
(1951-55), reel 10, NAACP Papers microfilm. In April 1955, during arguments on implementation, NAACP attorneys asked the Supreme Court to
adopt this date as well; Madison Jones, "The Impact and Consequences of the
U.S. Supreme Court Decision of May 17, 1954," Part 3, series C, reel 17,
NAACP Papers microfilm; Kluger, Simple Justice, 726-30.
40. Boyle, The Desegregated Heart, 194-96.
41. Quoted in Hershman, "A Rumbling in the Museum," 52.
42. Beagle and Osborne, J. Lindsay Almond, 96; Hershman, "A Rumbling
in the Museum," 48-49; Gates, The Making of Massive Resistance, 36-38,
161-62. On segregationists in Virginia being less likely to resort to physical
violence than segregationists elsewhere, see J. Douglas Smith, Managing, 3-4;
Buni, The Negro in Virginia Politics, 214; Hershman, "A Rumbling in the
Museum," 10-11.
43. Muse, Virginia's Massive Resistance, .8; Hershman, "A Rumbling in
the Museum," 103; Gates, The Making of Massive Resistance, xix. Patterson
notes that in 1942 only 2 percent of southern whites believed black and white
students snould go to the same schools; by 1956 the numbers had risen to 15
percent (Brown v. Board of Education, 7).
44. Initially, a number of liberals supported the efforts of the NAACP
either individually or via religio'us organizations; see Hershman, "A Rumbling
in the Museum," 49; Gates, The Making of Massive Resistance, 50-52; Muse,
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Virginia's Massive Resistance, 38. A leading white liberal organization, the
Virginia Council on Human Relations, worked with African Americans but
sought to minimize publicity surrounding their support for civil rights; see
Part 20, reel 13, frame 20, NAACP Papers microfilm. Whites who openly
supported desegregation faced significant repercussions; see Boyle, The
Desegregated Heart, 245, 264-65; Hershman, "A Rumbling in the Museum,"
187,249; "NAACP Press Release, June 7, 1956," Part 3, series D, reel 9,
frame 52, NAACP Papers microfilm.
45. Hershman, "A Rumbling in the Museum," 70; Gates, The Making of
Massive Resistance, xix. Moderates did not support racial equality or the mixing of the races. They also angrily opposed the NAACP; see Hershman, "A
Rumbling in the Museum," 95; Muse, Virginia's Massive Resistance, 48. In
Managing White Supremacy, J. Douglas Smith discusses Louis Jaffe, the
Pulitzer~Prize-winning editor of the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot. Jaffe, who "did
more than any white opinion-shaper in the Old Dominion to prod whites to
recognize their moral responsibility to provide better services, improve healthrelated conditions, and end the stain of lynching" was nonetheless a supporter
of segregation; see 238. See also J. Douglas Smith in The Moderates Dilemma,
40, on Armistead Boothe. In this essay, I use the phrases "white liberals" and
"white moderates" with some trepidation; the lines between were often blurry
and subject to change. They are employed here because of space limitations.
46. The moderate position, because it reluctantly accepted desegregation,
was considered anathema to many white Virginians, so long as other options
existed. The relationship between the NAACP and Virginia's white liberals,
moderates, and diehard segregationists fluctuated over time, and will be covered in more detail in my larger work-in-progress on the implementation of
Brown in Virginia. It is worth' noting that even white liberals periodically
asked the NAACP to slow down its implementation efforts, see "Negro
Crusaders Should Relax Awhile," Virginia Affairs Column (in the Washington
Post), Benjamin Muse, June 6, 1954, and Letter from Roy Wilkins to Dr. E. B.
Henderson, December 9, 1954, both in Part II, box A228, NAACP Papers.
47. The original ruling declared school segregation unconstitutional but
provided no guidelines for enforcement. Brown v. Board of Education,
Topeka, KS, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The follow-up decision is Brown v. Board
of Education, Topeka, KS, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). For more on Brown II, see
Kluger, Simple Justice, 744-47.
48. Italics added by author. "Memorandum to Emergency Regional
Conference, from Roy Wilkins and Thurgood Marshall, June 4, 1955," Part
3, series C, reel 14, NAACP Papers microfilm; see also "Resolutions,"
Supplement to Part One (1951-55), reel 12, NAACP Papers microfilm.
Marshall initially believed Brown II was a "damned good decision," which
helps expla!n why the national office stuck with its initial implementation program; Kluger, Simple Justice, 746.
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49. "NAACP Press Release, June 26, 1955/' Part 3, series C, reel 12,
NAACP Papers microfilm.
50. "Report of the Committee on Offenses against the Administration of
Justice," Appendix 12, Part 20, reel 12, frame 1019, NAACP Papers microfilm. Again the Virginia State Conference was clearly following the dictates of
the national office; see Letter from Roy Wilkins to Lester Banks, June 9, 1955,
Part II, box C212, NAACP Papers; "State NAACP to Sue in Some Areas
Soon," Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 10, 1955.
51. NAACP Annual Report, 1955 (New York: National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, 1955). "Report of the Commission on Law
Reform and Racial Activities," Part 20, reel 12,NAACP Papers microfilm;
Hershman, "A Rumbling in the Museum," 110-11; Anna Holden, The Bus
Stops Here: A Study of Desegregation in Three Cities (New York: Agathon
Press, 1974),22; "State NAACP to Sue In Some Areas Soon," Richmond
Times-Dispatch, October 10, 1955; Buni, The Negro in Virginia Politics, 177.
52. Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 187; Patterson, Brown v. Board of
Education, 80-82; Kluger, Simple Justice, 754; Robert Burk, Dwight D .
. Eisenhower: Hero and Politician (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1986), 159-60;
Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower, vol. 2 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983),
414-20. See Kluger, Simple Justice, 650, for more on Eisenhower's southern
political aspirations.
53. Quote is from Harvard Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality,
1954-1992 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993),36. Over time, Eisenhower's
refusal to endorse Brown and his cultivation of southern political support
undermined his support among African Americans.. For other evidence of the
National NAACP's growing frustration with President Eisenhower, see Report
of the Executive Secretary for the Month of April, 1956, Supplement to Part
One (1956-1960), reel 1, NAACP Papers microfilm; Finch, The NAACp, 196.
For Oliver Hill's perspective on Eisenhower, see Hill, The Big Bang, 247.
Eisenhower later referred to his appointment of Earl Warren-the chief architect of the Brown decision-to the Supreme Court as "the biggest damnfool
mistake I ever made." Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality, 24-25; Irons,
Jim Crow's ,Children, 201. Warren, for his part, was extremely upset by
Eisenhower's lack of public support for the ruling. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III,
From Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Court and School Integration:
1954-1978 (Oxford: Oxford Un'iversity Press, 1979),24.
54. On the Southern Manifesto and Senator Byrd, see Lassiter and Lewis,
The Moderates' Dilemma, 7; Gates, The Making of Massive Resistance, 118;
Kluger, Simple Justice, 752. On Congress, see Martin Luther King Jr. in Peter
Houck and Leslie Camm, African American Anthology (unpublished manuscript in the' author's possession), 245-57; Board ofDirectors Meeting
Minutes, November 8, 1954, Supplement to Part One (1951-1955), reel 1,
,NAACP Papers microfilm.
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55. Commenting on the importance of these ca~es before they were
decided, Thurgood Marshall and assistant special counsel Robert Carter
wrote, "Certainly the hearings in these cases will be of major significance
because these courts may be the first to give definite and specific content to 'a
prompt and reasonable start' and 'good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date"'; see Carter and Marshall, "Meaning and Significance," 400-401;
see also Kluger, Simple Justice, 747. The cases were Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F.
Supp. 776 (1955); Davis v. County School Board, Prince Edward County,
Virginia, 142 F. Supp. 616 (1956). Wilkins hoped that the decrees were "not
necessarily 'typical of what will happen throughout the South.'" "NAACP
Press Release, July 22, 1955," Part 3, series C, reel 17, NAACP Papers
microfilm.
56. On Emmett Till's death, ~ee Roy Wilkins in "NAACP Chief Assails
Foes ofIntegration," Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 8, 1955; also Dallas
Morning News, January 9, 1956, in Part 3, series D, reel 9, frame 4, NAACP
Papers microfilm. On the growing intimidation of NAACP officials in the
Deep South, see Letter from Ruby Hurley to Gloster Current, September 10,
1954, Part 25a, reel 4, frame 445, NAACP Papers microfilm.
57. Some NAACP attorneys had predicted this earlier; see Marshall and
Carter, "Meaning and Significance," 402. Meetings with southern NAACP
attorneys in the fall of 1955 encouraged the shift toward litigation; see "Board
of Directors Meeting Minutes," October 10, 1955, Supplement to Part One
(1951-55), reel 1, NAACP Papers microfilm. Growing frustration was also
evident within the Virginia NAACP. Hershman explains: "For those blacks
and whites strongly committed to the ideal of racial integration, 1955 was a
year of frustration and delay with every indication that compliance with
Brown would be a slow and difficult process" ("A Rumbling in the Museum,"
101). The national office recognized the lack of progress in the commonwealth as well; see Letter from Roy Wilkins to Dr. E. B. Henderson, October
25, 1955, Part II, box A228, NAACP Papers.
58. "NAACP Press Release, January 3, 1956," Supplement to Part One
(1956-60), reel 2, NAACP Papers microfilm; "Special Report to the New
York Times, February 20, 1956," Part 3, series D, reel 3, NAACP Papers
microfilm. It is worth noting that a small number of school desegregation lawsuits had been. filed in late 1955 by the NAACP. See "NAACP Press Release,
January 3, 1956"; Brian J. Daugherity, "'With All Deliberate Speed': The
NAACP and the Implementation of Brown v. Board of Education at the Local
Level, Little Rock, Arkansas, 1954-1957" (unpublished M.A. thesis,
University of Montana, 1997). This press release also notes that 1955 was
financially the best year in the history of the NAACP; an important consideration for the expansion of litigation.
59. "Report of the Executive Secretary for the Month of February, 1956,"
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Supplement to Part One (1956-1960), reel 1, NAACP Papers microfilm;
"Keynote Address by Thurgood Marshall to 47th Annual NAACP
Convention," Supplement to Part One (1956-1960), reel 4, NAACP Papers
microfilm. Lester Banks, Oliver Hill, and Spottswood Robinson attended the
Atlanta Conference; see "New NAACP School Suits Planned in State by
June," Richmond Times-Dispatch, February 20, 1956. For more on the
Atlanta Conference and the process of deciding where to file suits, see Letter
from Thurgood Marshall to State Conference Presidents, January 20, 195.6,
Part V, box V2595, NAACP Papers. For more on the NAACP's litigation protocol at this time, see Letter from Thurgood Marshall, August 15, 1955, Part
3, series C, reel 4, NAACP Papers microfilm.
60. The NAACP's determination to treat the southern states individl.lally,
based on the actions of their state governments and the status of desegregation
in each state, represents one of the reasons for the state-based approach of
this book. The eight states were Alabama, 'Florida, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia. Branches in other
southern states were strongly encouraged to continue avoiding litigation;
"Resolutions Adopted, 1956 Annual Convention," Supplement to Part One
(1956-1960), reel 4, NAACP Papers microfilm; "Special Report to New York
Times," February 20, 1956, Part 3, series D, reel 3, NAACP Papers microfilm.
For more on these 1956 lawsuits, see Minutes of the Board of Directors
Meeting, May 14, 1956; Minutes of the Board of Directors Meeting, June 11,
1956, both in Supplement to Part One (1956-1960), reel 1, NAACP Papers
microfilm.
61. Virginia NAACP attorneys had discussed this shift in strategy with
national office staff at the state NAACP's twentieth annual meeting in October
1955. Wilkins, Marshall, Hill, and others closely involved in the implementation of Brown attended. Afterward, Spottswood Robinson approached
representatives of the Arlington NAACP and informed them that the State
Conference was ready to prepare to file suit in that community. See "Report
of the Commission on Law Reform and Racial Activities," Part 20, reel 12,
NAACP Papers microfilm; Gates, The Making of Massive Resistance, 56;
"State NAACP to Sue in Some Areas Soon," Richmond Times-Dispatch,
October 10, 1955. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund helped the state NAACP
with its lawsuits. For more on the litigation, see Hershman, "A Rumbling in
the Museum," 220-26; Gates, The Making of Massive Resistance, 125-27;
Robert A. Pratt, The Color of Their Skin: Education and Race in Richmond,
Virginia, 1954-89 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992), 7.
62. Quote is' from "State NAACP to Sue in Some Areas Soon," Richmond
Times-Dispatch, October 10, 1955.
63. Hershman, "A Rumbling in the Museum," 253; Muse, Virginia's
Massive Resistance, 31; Boyle, The Desegregated Heart, 245,264-65. For
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more on how white moderates and liberals responded to the NAACP suits, see
Hershman, "A Rumbling in the Museum," 215-17.
64. Quote is from Muse, Virginia's Massive Resistance, 48. See also Gates,
The Making of Massive Resistance, 59; Pratt, The Color of Their Skin, 7.
65. Buni, The Negro in Virginia Politics, notes: "What provoked action
from white Virginian leadership, however, was that Negroes continued to
press for school integration through the federal courts" (177; see also 184).
Gates notes that future governor J. Lindsey Almond urged Governor Stanley
to call 1956 special session after the NAACP filed its suits (The Making of
Massive Resistance, 128).
66. On the State Department of Education decision, see Hershman, "A
Rumbling in the Museum," 111. On the Gray Commission report, see Gates,
The Making of Massive Resistance, 63-:69. On Virginia's Resolution of
Interposition, see Gates, The Making of Massive Resistance, 114; Beagle and
Osborne, J. Lindsay Almond, 100. Muse notes that the resolution was forwarded to each member of the U.S. Congress and the Supreme Court
(Virginia's Massive Resistance, 21-22,27).
67. Describing the Southern Manifesto, Harry Byrd said the document was
part of "the plan of massive resistance we've been working on." See Beagle
and Osborne, J. Lindsay Almond, 93-101.
68. Quote is from Joseph Thorndike, "The Sometimes Sordid Level of
Race and Segregation," in Moderates Dilemma, 54. Thorndike also notes the
NAACP's belated recognition of Kilpatrick's influence on southern desegregation; see 62-63 for quotes from Thurgood Marshall. Senator Byrd was a strong
public supporter of Kilpatrick; see Muse, Virginia's Massive Resistance, 21.
69. For more on the special session and its legislation, see Gates, The
Making of Massive Resistance, 169-90; Beagle and Osborne, J. Lindsay ,
Almond, 102-3; Hershman, "A Rumbling in the Museum," 187-89. Many in
Virginia believed the General Assembly's actions encouraged Massive
Resistance further South; see Hill, The Big Bang, 247.
70. Quote is from Hershman, "A Rumbling in the Museum," 208.
Thomson was a brother-in-law of Harry Byrd Sr. For more on the state's antiNAACP laws, see Hershman, "A Rumbling in the Museum," 209; Gates, The
Making of Massive Resistance, 184; "Acts of Special Session of General
Assembly of Virginia (Passed September 29, 1956), anti-NAACP legislation,"
Part 20, reel 12, NAACP Papers microfilm. Fairclough notes that Louisiana
adopted similar anti-NAACP measures (Race and Democracy, 225). Most
other southern states did the same. Sitkoff notes: "By 1958 the NAACP had
lost 246 branches in the South, and the South's percentage of the NAACP's
total membership had dropped from nearly 50 percent to just about 25 percent" (The Struggle for Black Equality, 28). See also Fairclough, Race and
Democracy, 207-16. The anti-NAACP climate may have affected the National
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NAACP in other ways; in 1956 the IRS forced the NAACP and its Legal
Defense Fund to formally separate; see Tomiko Brown-Nagin, "The Impact of
Lawyer-Client Disengagement on the NAACP's Campaign to Implement
Brown v. Board of Education in Atlanta," 236, in Grassroots.
71. The committees subpoenaed and questioned NAACP leaders,
demanded financial and membership records, and interviewed plaintiffs
involved in the school desegregation cases. Such requests continued into the
1960s. Hill, The Big Bang, 179-80; Hershman, "A Rumbling in the
Museum," 210-14; "Report of the Committee on Law Reform and Racial
Activities" and "Report of the Committee on Offenses against the Administration of Justice," both in Part 20, reel 12, NAACP Papers microfilm.
72. On the public stance, see Buni, The Negro in Virginia Politics, 187.
For more on the negative effects of the anti-NAACP laws, see Muse, Virginia's
Massive Resistance, 49, 52-53; Hershman, "A Rumbling in the Museum,"
214,253. State Conference leaders faced some of the most severe harassment;
Oliver White Hill, interview with the author, Richmond, Virginia, December 3,
1999. For the financial impact on the Virginia NAACP, see "Income Received
from Branches in the State of Virginia, Jan. 1, thru Aug. 31, for 1955, 1956,
1957," Part 20, reel 12, NAACP Papers microfilm. Black teachers were also
pressured to disassociate themselves from the NAACP; see "NAACP Keynotes
Gives Plan to Make Integration Reality," Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 6,
19~6; also Letter from Clarissa Wimbush Carey to Roy Wilkins, February 5,
1963, Part 3, box C155, NAACP Papers. For the Virginia NAACP's legal
attacks on the state's anti-NAACP laws, see Part 20, reel 12, frame 999,
NAACP Papers microfilm.
73. "Letter from E. B. Henderson to Dear - - - : , February 28, 1957,"
Part 20, reel 12, NAACP Papers microfilm.
74. "Letter from Lester Banks to Roy Wilkins, March 14, 1957," Part 20,
reel 12, NAACP Papers microfilm.
75. "Confidential letter from Lester Banks to 'Dear Co-Worker,'" misdated February 14, 1956 (actual date is 1957), Part 20, reel 12, NAACP
Papers microfilm.
76. Charlottesville was to begin in the fall of 1956, and Arlington in January
1957. Gates, The Making of Massive Resistance, 191; Hershman, "A Rumbling
in the Museum," 227-31. The role of Virginia's federal judges in forcing the
state to comply with Brown should be noted; Hill, The Big Bang, 176.
77. For more on the litigation surrounding pupil placement, see
Hershman, "A Rumbling in the Museum," 227-31; Gates, The Making of
Massive Resistance, 191; Ruth Pendleton James v. J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., civil
action number 2843, Part V, box V2836, NAACP Papers. Renewed orders
were for Charlottesville and Arlington; that summer, orders were handed
down for Norfolk and Warren County.
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78. Almond did so using components of the state's new massive resistance
legislation. The closed schools were white schools that black plaintiffs were
admitted to by the courts; local black schools remained open. A former
Virginia attorney general, Almond was elected governor on a massive
resistance platform in November 1957.
79. Quote is from Pratt, The Color of Their Skin, 10; see also 9.
Hershman, "A Rumbling in the Museum," 304; Gates, The Making of
Massive Resistance, 210; Boyle, The Desegregated Heart, xvii. The largest
white moderate organization was the Virginia Committee for Public Schools,
organized in late 1958. The NAACP suit was abandoned in October in lieu of
a separate lawsuit filed against the school-closing law, and private funding
scheme, by a moderate white organization from Norfolk-the second suit represented all the affected students, not just the black plaintiffs. See Hershman,
"A Rumbling in the Museum," 114-15.
80. Hershman, "A Rumbling in the Museum," 115; Gates, The Makingof
Massive Resistance, 210-11. Almond, an attorney by profession, was
undoubtedly influenced by the events that had unfolded in Little Rock,
Arkansas, in the fall of 1957.
81. Hershman, "A Rumbling in the Museum," 348; Gates, The Making of
Massive Resistance, 211, Pratt, The Color of Their Skin, 11; Oliver Hill, interview with 'the author, Richmond, December 3, 1999.
82. On the pupil placement law, see ]. Douglas Smith, "When Reason
Collides with Prejudice," in The Moderates' Dilemma, 46-47; Lassiter and
Lewis, The Moderates' Dilemma, 8. On the new tuition grant law, see Andrew
Lewis, "Emergency Mothers," in The Moderates' Dilemma, 98; "Sanctuaries
for Tradition: Virginia's New Private Schools," Special Report, Southern
Regional Council, February 8, 1961, Part 3 series D, reel 13, frame 882,
NAACP Papers microfilm. The NAACP fought the state's tuition grant legislation in court for most of the 19'60s; see "Eight Schools May Still Get State
Grants," Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 7, 1965.
83. Quote is from Lassiter and Lewis, The Moderates' Dilemma, 4; see
also 18-19. As the editor of The News, of Lynchburg, explained on April 19,
1963: "We are opposed to integration in the public schools. We strongly support law and order. We will go along with only such integration as we feel is
necessary to comply with the law as interpreted by the Federal courts." Prince
Edward County, Virginia, took more dramatic action. Facing desegregation in
the fall of 1959, county officials discontinued funding for the public schools,
closing them for the indefinite future. The schools remained closed until 1964,
when state and federal courts ordered them reopened. See Edward H. Peeples,
"A Perspective on the Prince Edward County School Issue" (M.A. thesis,
University of Pennsylvania, 1963), unpublished manuscript available at the
Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia.
84. The pupil placement system had been revived by the Virginia state
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government in 1959. For factors used by the state PPB to deny black applicants in the early 1960s, see "Negro Transfer Discussion Held," The News,
June 28, 1961. Having the state PPB force desegregation on districts throughout the state must have seemed ironic considering its previous commitment to
maintaining segregation statewide. It changed in part because of growing pressure from the NAACP and federal courts; see "New State Policy on Pupil
Shifts Disclosed Here," Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 15, 1963.
85. Part 3d, reel 13, frames 918-19, NAACP Papers microfilm, discusses
pupil placement in Arlington County, Virginia. In 1963, Arlington also
became the first district in Virginia to allow black teachers to work with students of both races; see "Negro Teachers for Whites Seen," Richmond TimesDispatch, April 5, 1963.
86. On the high court's acceptance of tokenism, see Sitkoff, The Struggle
for Black Equality, 27; Kluger, Simple Justice, 752; Fairclough, Race and
Democracy, 239. On its growing impatience, see "High Court Warns States on
Schools," Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 28, 1963. The number of black
students in desegregated schools in Virginia grew from 30 in the spring of
1959, to 103 in February 1960, to 547 in September 1961, to 1,100 in June
1963; see Muse, Virginia's Massive Resistance, 159; Gates, The Making of
Massive Resistance, 211; "1,200 Negroes Hope to Enter White Schools,"
Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 3, 1963; see also Eugene Piedmont,
"Changing Racial Attitudes at a Southern University: 1947-1964," Journal of
Negro Education 36, no. 1 (Winter 1967): 33-34.
87. Kluger, Simple Justice, 759; "School Desegregation Plans Submitted by
470 Districts," Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 11, 1965.
88. The Virginia State Department of Education now strongly urged compliance and monitored the compliance process. It was influenced by the $64.2
million dollars in federal aid for education that Virginia was scheduled to
receive in the fiscal year starting July 1; see "Mixed Schools Are Required by
Fall, 1967," April 30, 1965, "Middlesex Plan Is Sent to HEW," June 4, 1965,
both in Richmond Times-Dispatch. Several Virginia localities initially planned
to forfeit their federal funds; Amelia County was one of the last to submit
compliance paperwork to HEW. Had it refused, the county would have forfeited about $240,000 of a school budget of $575,000; see "Public School
Desegregation in Amelia Seen," Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 11, 1965.
For more information on this process throughout Virginia, see "Sussex Says
Deadline No Factor," June 16, 1965; "78 Pledges On Schools Are Received,"
March 4, 1965; "Signed Form Not to Assure School Funds," April 22, 1965,
all in the Richmond Times-Dispatch. For HEW's guidelines, see Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 78 Stat. 246, 42 U.S.c. 2000c-d, 45 CFR
80.1-80.13, 181.1-181.76 (1967). Freedom of choice was initially accepted
partly due to continued resistance in the Deep South.
89. Statistic is from "Nottoway, Lunenburg, Bland Ordered to Integrate
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Schools," Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 14, 1965. African Americans, however, were not usually accepted as equals during token desegregation. In the
Fredericksburg area in 1961, the first black students were brought to the
white schools on segregated buses; Fredericksburg Lance-Star, May 16,2004,
A8. In other cases, black students were asked to, give up extracurricular activities, or such activities were simply eliminated; Fredericksburg Lance-Star, May
16,2004, A8. At the same time, segregated black schools continued to suffer
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